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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH,. : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
-vs- : Case No. 
14586 
WILLIAM L. FORSYTH, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, William L. Forsyth, appeals from 
an order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 
judgment and sentence entered thereon in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court, Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
J. Robert Bullock, presiding* 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
v/as denied oy the Honorable J. Robert Bullock on March 31 , 1976, 
and appellant was sentenced for an indeterminate term in the 
Utah State Prison, with execution of the sentence stayed 
pending appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests that the order denying 
appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with appellant's 
Statement of Facts, but makes the following deletions, 
additions and corrections: 
1. On August 11 and 12, 1975, after the preliminary 
hearing, appellant and his original counsel discussed the 
matters involved, the importance of the preparation, and 
counsel's fee requirements (Tr.50). Appellant stated that 
he had to see some friends and relatives to arrange for the 
fee and get back to his counsel (Tr.51). Between the arraign-
ment on September 12, 1975, and the trial date on January 5, 
1976, however, appellant contacted his counsel only once and 
had failed to make the necessary arrangements. Appellant's 
counsel had tried many times but failed to contact appellant 
(Tr.51-54). 
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2. During appellant's colloquy with the court 
concerning the voluntariness of his guilty plea, he stated 
that he had not been threatened by anyone except the pursuit 
of other charges against him if he did not plead guilty (Tr. 
73) . 
3. Appellant made no complaints about his 
attorney up to the time of his guilty plea. 
4. The prosecutor denied that any of his statements 
during the plea bargaining process were not in compliance 
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics and claimed that appellant's 
motives in pleading guilty, attempting to withdraw the 
plea, not cooperating with counsel, and not cooperating 
with Adult Probation and Parole were merely to manipulate 
the entire judicial process (Tr.100). 
5. The probable cause standard enunciated by 
the court was in reference to the sufficiency of appellant's 
alleged defense during the hearing on the motion to withdraw 
and not in reference to sufficiency of the State's evidence 
(Tr.117). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA WAS MADE VOLUNTARILY 
AND FREE FROM COERCION BECAUSE ANY STATEMENTS MADE BY THE 
PROSECUTION DID NOT OVERCOME THE WILL OF THE APPELLANT TO 
RATIONALLY WEIGH THE CHOICES BEFORE HIM. 
In determining the voluntariness of a guilty 
plea, the United States Supreme Court, in an article 
contained in 25 L.Ed.2d 1025, 1029-30 (1971), enumerated 
a number of factors which can be taken into consideration, 
among them whether the plea was induced by some form of 
coercion, such as threats or intimidation. Appellant 
alleges that his guilty plea was coerced as a result of 
threats by the prosecution and his own counsel and by his 
counsel's conduct with respect to financial matters. Even 
if such threats were in fact made, it does not necessarily 
follow that the guilty plea was coerced. To be entitled 
to relief, appellant must show (1) that the threats were 
made; (2) that such threats did in fact influence him; 
and (3) that the influence was such that it amounted to 
coercion. Gardner v. State, 537 P.2d 467 (Nev. 1975). 
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In determining whether or not appellant was in fact caerced, 
the court may consider all of the evidence including the 
record taken at the time the appellant entered his plea of 
guilty. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 
25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). 
The fact that any threats were ever made by the 
prosecution to the appellant was strongly contested by the 
prosecution with the following: 
"There is no time when the 
defendant has been—when I have had 
direct contact with the defendant. 
I have made comments with regard to 
plea bargaining in the matter with 
defendant's counsel in his law office. 
At this time the defendant was not 
present. I made statements to the 
defendant's attorney in the hall 
probably less than a minute, in 
discussing some of the pros and cons 
of him pleading. At no time were any 
of these discussions not in compliance 
with the A.B.A. Canons of Ethics with 
regard to plea bargaining in criminal 
matters. It is my opinion, your Honor, 
that the defendant has attempted to 
manipulate his own counsel in this case* 
he's attempted to manipulate the Federal 
Court to get involved in the State in 
this case at this time, he' s attempted 
to manipulate the Adult Probation and 
Parole, and he's attempted to manipulate 
this court with regard to the entire 
proceedings." (Tr.100). 
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The test for determining whether or not these 
statements, if any, did sufficiently influence the 
appellant in his decision to plead guilty, was outlined 
in Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 452 P.2d 323, 324 
(1969), where this Court stated: 
"But the mere fact that a 
defendant, against whom there are 
multiple charges pending, pleads 
guilty to one of them on the condi-
tion that the others be dropped 
certainly does not in and of itself 
compel a finding of coercion. There 
is nothing in this regard to justify 
a conclusion that the will of the 
plaintiff (sic "defendant") was 
overcome, or that he did not 
rationally weigh the choices before 
him and choose the one which he then 
thought was most beneficial to his 
interest." 
In accordance with the great volume of caselaw in this 
area, Strong indicates that in determining the voluntariness 
of a guilty plea, courts of necessity must focus on the question 
of what factor or factors motivated a defendant to plead 
guilty in a particular case. If, for example, the guilty 
plea was the considered choice of the accused, free of 
coercion, promises or any other factor or inducement which 
overcame the will of the accused, and was a free and 
rational conclusion based upon the various alternatives 
open to him, the plea is said to be voluntary. This is true 
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regardless of the defendant's guilt of the specific crime 
in question. If, on the other hand, the accused pleaded 
guilty because of some influence not properly to be 
considered as a factor in his decision, then the plea 
is said not to be voluntary. See, e.g., United States 
ex rel. Brown v. LuVallee, 301 F.Supp. 1245, 1253 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969). 
The Court in Brady, supra, also emphasized that 
possible innocence of the defendant and certain encourage-
ments and motivations by the prosecution are not solely 
determinative of the coercion question. It was said there: 
"The State to some degree encourages 
pleas of guilty at every important step 
in the criminal process. For some people 
their breach of a State's law is alone 
sufficient reason for surrendering them-
selves and accepting punishment. For 
others, apprehension and charge, both 
threatening acts by the Government, jar 
them into admitting their guilt. In still 
other cases the post-indictment accumulation of 
evidence may convince the defendant and his 
counsel that a trial is not worth the agony 
and expense to the defendant and his family. 
All these pleas of guilty are valid in spite 
of the State's responsibility for some of 
the factors motivating the pleas; the pleas 
are no more improperly compelled than is the 
decision by a defendant at the close of the 
Statef s evidence at trial that he must take 
the stand or face certain conviction." 397 
U.S. at 750, 90 S.Ct. at 1470. 
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Respondent contends that the detailed transcript 
of the inquiry by the trial court into the voluntariness 
of the guilty plea clearly established no coercion suffi-
cient to overcome the free will of the appellant (Tr.69-74), 
Appellant specifically stated that he had not been threatened 
with anything other than the pursuit of charges agreed to be 
dropped in accordance with the plea bargain (Tr.73). In 
addition, contrary to his assertion that he anticipated 
probation, appellant stated he had not been promised 
anything and was told to dismiss any promise from his 
consideration (Tr.70,72,73,97). Moreover, not only is 
appellant's belief as to his innocence not conclusive as 
to involuntariness, as stated above, but appellant stated, 
after conferring with his counsel, that he pleaded guilty 
because he was guilty (Tr.72). Finally, any possible 
adverse financial considerations could validly form the 
basis of a guilty plea under Brady, supra. For these 
reasons, it is clear that appellant was not coerced or 
threatened beyond that of the realities for any defendant 
in any case. He rationally weighed the choices before 
him and in light of the evidence, would have undoubtedly 
plead guilty even without the benefit of the prosecutor!s 
statements or adverse financial circumstances. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY USED A PROBABLE 
CAUSE STANDARD IN DETERMINING FACTUAL BASIS FOR 
THE GUILTY PLEA BECAUSE A DETERMINATION OF GUILT 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT OR EVEN BY THE PREPONDERANCE 
OF THE EVIDENCE IS UNNECESSARY. 
Prior to a complete summary of evidence by the 
prosecution with respect to appellant's guilt, the 
court considered the question of whether appellant had 
a meritorious defense to the prosecution's claims. 
At this time the court stated that it was using a 
probable cause standard rather than beyond a reason-
able doubt (Tr.117). The court noted that it was 
not necessary to establish the defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt since that standard is normally left 
to the jury during a trial. The question as to the 
standard was raised by the prosecution and not the 
defense. Whether the court used a probable cause 
standard in determining factual basis of all the evidence 
is unknown. Although many cases are presented with 
the issue of whether there is a sufficient factual 
basis for the guilty plea, most courts fail to 
articulate a general standard in addition to the 
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statutory standard already in existence. In Utah, 
it appears that no statutory standard or procedural 
rule requires factual basis. The United States Supreme 
Court does require that a guilty plea be based upon 
some factual basis. Nevertheless, all courts are 
in agreement with the trial court in the present 
case that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is 
unnecessary. In People v. Hobbs, 242 N.W.2d 535 
(Mich. App. 197 6), where the appellant contended 
that his plea-based conviction for assault with 
intent to rob was not grounded upon adequate factual 
basis, the court held that the rule requires only 
substantial support for the appellant's guilt, not 
conclusive proof of the crime charged. In addition, 
in People v. Meyer, 28 111.App. 3d 221, 328 N.E.2d 
190, 192 (1975), where appellant contended there was 
no sufficient factual basis for his plea to the crime 
of burglary, the court held: 
"The requirement of a factual 
basis for the guilty plea is met 
where it appears from the record 
that there is a basis for reason-
ably concluding that the defendant 
committed the crime he was charged 
with (including any requisite intent, 
as here); it does not have to appear 
on the record beyond & reasonable 
doubt or even by the preponderance 
of the evidence that the defendant 
did commit the crime." 
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Appellant contends that because his guilty 
pie? was coupled with assertions of innocence the 
tri court should have used a higher standard 
for the determination of factual basis of the plea* 
It should be noted, however, that at the time appellant 
pleaded guilty he made no assertions of innocence. 
In fact, appellant specifically stated that he was 
pleading guilty because he was guilty (Tr.72). It 
was only at the time of withdrawal of the plea that 
appellant contended innocence. Respondent contends 
that once the trial court has satisfied itself that 
there is a factual basis for the guilty plea and it 
is voluntarily and intelligently made, the court 
need not reiterate all of the evidence against the 
accused upon the record a second time. This also 
emphasizes that the trial court used a probable cause 
standard only in relation to appellant's alleged 
defense. Clearly, the court was correct in not using 
a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in deter-
mining factual basis for the original plea or for 
appellant's defense. Regardless of the exact standard 
used it is evident under Point III that there was 
a sufficient factual basis to support appellant's 
plea and motion for withdrawal. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THERE 
WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH A FACTUAL BASIS 
FOR APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA. 
It is a well-settled rule that the trial 
court is not required to specifically require of 
the defendant as to the factual basis for a plea 
of guilty. Inquiring of the county attorney, 
examination of the presentence report, minutes of 
testimony, conversations with both sides during & 
plea negotiation conference, or from ctny other part 
of the record, if before the court, are alternative 
methods. State v. Painter, 195 Neb. 183, 237 N.W.2d 
142 (1976); People v. Emery, 30 Ill.App. 3d 466, 344 
N.E.2d 43 (1976); State v. Huizar, 112 Ariz. 489, 543 
P.2d 1118 (1975); People v. Robinson, 28 111. App. 3d 
757, 329 N.E.2d 317 (1975). 
Hromthe record it is clear that the trial court 
satisfied itself there was a factual basis for the 
guilty plea. At the time of the plea appellant specifically 
stated that he pleaded guilty because he was guilty 
(tr.72). In addition, Count I of the Information was 
read to the appellant so that he would be absolutely 
certain regarding the offense to which he was to plead 
(Tr.69). By the time of the decision on appellant's 
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motion to withdraw the plea the presentence report 
had not been filed (Tr.154). During the hearing on 
appellant's motion to withdraw the plea the court 
listened to fourteen transcript pages of evidence 
presented by the prosecution as to what evidence it 
intended to introduce into trial (Tr.126-139)• This 
is in addition to the fact that the appellant had 
appeared before the trial court at least eight times 
upon different motions and circumstances and was thus 
well aware of the factual basis behind the plea. 
Appellant contends that the trial court failed 
to find a sufficient factual basis to support appellantfs 
intent to commit the crime, as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-405 (i) (Supp. 1975). The prosecution 
detailed the scheme of appellant and explained several 
times how intent could be shown from the deception 
(Tr. 126-128, 131, 136). As stated under Point II above, 
it was unnecessary for the trial court to resolve all 
questions beyond a reasonable doubt. In Interest of 
Higgins, 348 N.E.2d 292, 295 (111. App. 1976), where 
defendant's guilty plea to the crime of battery was 
accepted over the possible defense of self-defense, 
the court sr.ated the following standard: 
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"The requirement that the 
trial court be satisfied there 
is a factual basis for the plea 
before accepting a guilty plea 
does not compel the court to 
resolve all contradictory evidence 
in the case. The court need not 
be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt there is a factual basis 
for each element of the offense 
charged." 
For these reasons, respondent contends the 
trial court correctly determined there was sufficient 
evidence to form a factual basis for appellant*s 
guilty plea. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE APPELLANT DID NOT PRESENT A 
PLAUSIBLE BASIS FOR WITHDRAWING HIS GUILTY PLEA. 
It is also a well settled standard in the State 
of Utah that the granting or refusing to permit the 
withdrawal of a guilty plea is a matter which lies in 
the sound discretion of the trial judge. Henline v. 
Smith, 548 P.2d 1271 (1976); State v. Plum, 14 Utah 2d 
124, 378 P.2d 671 (1963); Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 
913 (10th Cir. 1973); State v. Lee Limy 79 Utah 68f 7 
P.2d 825 (1932). This is in accordance with the Utah 
Code of Criminal Procedure in Utah Coce Ann. § 77-24-3 
(1953), which states: 
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"The court may at any time 
before judgment, upon a plea of 
guilty, permit it to be withdrawn 
and a plea of not guilty substituted." 
Under Point I above, it was shown that appellant's 
guilty plea was not coerced because he was able to make a free 
and rational decision between the available alternatives. Any 
statements by the prosecution or appellant's original counsel 
were not sufficient to overcome the will of the appellant. 
Thus, any alleged coercive statements cannot be considered 
as factors in determining the withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
Appellant alleges three factors which the court 
failed to consider in its decision to deny appellant's motion 
to withdraw: no prejudice to the State; this was a pre-sentence 
motion; and appellant's innocence. Respondent admits that 
post-sentence motions to withdraw may be somewhat less 
reliable, but contends that simply because the motion was 
made prior to sentencing does not call for a wholesale abandon-
ment of guilty pleas. In the present case, it should be 
remembered that appellant agreed to plead guilty pursuant to 
a plea bargaining process, upon the advice of competent counsel, 
voluntarily and understandingly, during an extended dialogue 
with the trial court. This is not a case where the appellant 
was intoxicated, spoke a foreign language, or was not given 
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the promised bargain by the prosecution. The prosecution 
kept its part of the bargain by dismissing a series of 
counts of the information pursuant to the agree ant. In 
Stinson, supra, the court held that where the appellant 
had made a recent and clear statement before the sentencing 
judge that he understood the charge and the maximum punish-
ment and the judge was advised of the plea bargain, the 
refusal to permit the plea to be withdrawn was not an abuse 
of discretion by the State trial court. 
Other cases have reached similar results. In 
State v. Huntley, 129 N.J. Super. 13, 322 A.2d 177, 179 
(1974), where appellant desired to withdraw his guilty pleas 
to robbery and sodomy prior to sentencing, the court held: 
"We have canvassed the entire 
record and agree with the trial judge 
that the guilty pleas were voluntarily 
and knowingly entered, and that the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion 
in refusing to permit withdrawal of the 
pleas. . . Defendant's bare assertions 
that he mistakenly entered his guilty 
pleas, and that he was improperly coerced 
to do so, are unsupported in the record. 
His late protestations of innocence, and 
the victim's certification of defendant's 
innocence on the sodomy charge were found 
to be unworthy of belief, and were properly 
rejected by the trial judge. . . The figure 
of justice is blindfolded but is not blind 
to thoo } who seek to make a mockery of 
justice. . . 
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" . . . when a voluntary and knowing 
plea bargain has been entered into 
simultaneously with the guilty plea, 
defendant's burden of presenting a 
plausible basis for his request to 
withdraw his guilty plea is heavier. 
The approved philosophy of 'plea 
bargaining1 is dependent upon the good 
faith of both sides in carrying out the 
bargain when it is voluntarily and 
knowingly made, is fair and just and is 
ultimately approved by the trial judge. 
A whimsical change of mind by defendant, 
or the prosecutor, will not be a valid 
reason for altering the bargain . . . 
Even a belatea P^sertion of innocence 
will not upset an otherwise validly 
entered into plea bargain." North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 
160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970). (Emphasis 
added.) 
In State v. Ellison, 111 Ariz. 167, 526 P.2d 706, 
707 (1974), the Court said: 
"It is not sufficient to show that 
the defendant merely changed his mind if 
he was advised by counsel throughout the 
proceedings, understood the proceedings 
to the best of his ability, and was under 
no coercion or misapprehension concerning 
the consequences of his guilty plea. . . 
In fact, a defense attorney may be performing 
his best service for his client in advising 
him to plead guilty as a means of bargaining 
for the most lenient treatment possible." 
For these reasons it is clear that merely because the appellant 
made his belated protestations of innocence prior to sentencing, 
this Court need not reject acceptance of the plea. The trial 
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court specifically determined appellant's motives of 
manipulating the system and correctly used its discretion 
to deny appellant's motion. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT RECEIVED ADEQUATE ASSISTANCE OF 
COMPETENT COUNSEL BECAUSE HIS ATTORNEY WAS A COMPETENT 
MEMBER OF THE BAR WHO SHOWED A WILLINGNESS TO IDENTIFY 
HIMSELF WITH AND REPRESENT THE INTERESTS OF APPELLANT IN 
GOOD FAITH. 
The right to effective or adequate assistance of 
counsel was first enunciated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 72 L.Ed. 158, 53 
S.Ct. 55 (1932), which held that failure to make an 
effective appointment of counsel violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel and is a denial of due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Later cases have held that ctdequate assistance of 
counsel depends on whether the advice to plead guilty was 
within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases. McMann v. Richardsonr 397 U.S. 759, 90 
S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); ToLlett v. Henderson, 
411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Cc. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). 
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Beyond the general tests hinted in Tollett and McMann, 
however, the Supreme Court has relegated to state and 
lower courts the task of defining more specifically 
the standard of adequate representation by counsel. 
In Strong v. Turner, supra, this Court outlined 
the test of competence of court appointed counsel in pre-
trial proceedings with respect to a guilty plea as follows: 
"No one will question that the 
right of an accused to counsel means 
by a competent member of the Bar who 
shows a willingness to identify 
himself with and represent the interests 
of the defendant in good faith." 
452 P.2d at 324. 
The court held that the mere fact that counsel held 
relatively brief conferences with the accused prior to 
entry of the guilty plea did not establish that the accused 
was denied effective representation by counsel. Other 
Utah cases also suggest that the Court look to the 
record for suggestions of "bad faith conduct on the part 
of the attorney." Washington v* Turner, 17 Utah 2d 361, 
412 P.2d 449 (1966). This concept of "bad faith" was 
defined in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 121, 449 P.2d 
241, 243 (1969), as follows: 
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"The [due process] requirement 
[of counsel] is not satisfied by a 
sham or pretense of an cippearance in 
the record by an attorney who 
manifests no real concern about the 
interests of the accused.11 (Emphasis 
added.) 
Appellant does not contend that his original 
counsel was incompetent. He maintains, however, that 
counsel's representation with respect to fees and proba-
tion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Respondent contends that the record clearly shows 
appellant had not only adequate but effective assistance 
of competent counsel. 
It should be noted preliminarily that appellant's 
counsel in the present case was privately retained rather than 
court assigned. This Court in Strong, supra, observed that 
counsel was court-appointed and many other courts make a 
similar distinction. See, e.g., Loftis v. Esteele, 515 
F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Slayton, 353 F.Supp. 
571 (Va. 1973); "Modern Status of Rule as to Test in 
Federal Court of Effective Representation by Counsel," 
26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 238 (1976). Although such a distinction 
is not determinative of appellant's claims, it is important 
in that appellant was represented by counsel o£ his own 
choosing. 
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Other facts support the contention that appellant 
was adequately represented. On January 5, 1976, the court 
entertained defense counsel's motion for continuance. 
Grounds for the continuance were stated by appellant's 
counsel as follows: 
"A preliminary hearing was held 
August 11th and 12th I believe, Your 
Honor. At that time I discussed with 
my client the matters involved, the 
importance of the preparation and my 
fee requirements. My client stated that 
he would attend to these matters. We 
came to—or I came to Provo, defendant 
lives in Orem, he was arraigned and trial 
was set in this matter for January 5, 1976. 
And that was on the 12th day of September, 
1975. Thereafter, Your Honor, my client 
informed me that he had several small 
business matters to attend to, that he 
had to see some of his friends and relatives 
to arrange for the fee, and that he would be 
back in contact with me shortly to make his 
records available to me and to review the 
situation. I did not again hear from my 
client until December 2, 1975. In the 
meantime I had written several letters to 
his residence, which he did not receive 
because he was not there and apparently not 
in contact with them. My client agreed to be 
in on the 10th. He did not come in. He 
called my office on Saturday the 12th or 13th 
and said that he would—spoke to my secretary, 
sait that he would be in the following week. 
He did not come in. I finally reached him by 
telephone, and he came to my office on Monday 
following Christmas, that would have been 
December 29th, said he had one small business 
matter to attend to and would be back that 
evening or the following day.11 (Tr. 50-51) 
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Appellant's counsel also showed his willingness 
to represent appellant after the hearing when he entered 
into plea negotiations at the request of the prosecution 
(Tr.20-21). Moreover, appellant's counsel continued to be 
interested and participate in the case even when appellant 
hired another attorney. At no time prior to or during the 
entry of the guilty plea did appellant express his dis-
satisfaction with his counsel. And, as stated in Brady, 
supra, financial circumstances can justifiably form the 
basis of a guilty plea. For these reasons, respondent 
contends that appellant was adequately represented by 
counsel and any fears he acquired were unjustified and 
unreasonable in light of his attorney's good faith effort 
to advise him of the most beneficial course of conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant was not coerced into entering 
his guilty plea, his plea was supported by adequate factual 
basis according to the correct standard of the trial court, 
his motion to withdraw the plea was discretionary with the 
trial court and he was effectively represented by counsel, 
respondent respectfully requests that this Court dismiss 
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appellantfs appeal and affirm the judgment and sentence 
of the trial court rendered below. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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